Inattentional blindness (IB) describes the failure to notice salient but unexpected stimuli when attention is partially engaged by another task. Few studies have explicitly investigated the role of eye movements in IB and the relative contributions of overt and covert attention. We recorded eye movements in a series of IB experiments using dynamic stimuli. Results indicate that eye movements do not predict IB; noticers and nonnoticers were equally likely to fixate on or near the unexpected item, often for similar durations. Perceptual load also determines whether observers will fixate the unexpected object. In a high perceptual load task, IB was high (81%) and most participants did not allocate overt attention to the unexpected object. Under lower perceptual load IB decreased to 54% and both noticers and nonnoticers fixated on the unexpected object.
Introduction
Detecting sudden changes in our environment has a clear evolutionary advantage: it heightens our responsiveness to potentially threatening events by allowing us time to react. It is therefore counterintuitive, and lacks biological sense, that we frequently experience clear and obvious events in our visual world that we simply fail to see. This failure to notice a salient but unexpected stimulus when attention is engaged by another task is known as inattentional blindness (IB; Mack & Rock, 1998) . IB is a highly robust effect and has been consistently demonstrated using static (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Koivisto, Hyönä, & Revonsuo, 2004; Mack & Rock, 1998; White & Aimola Davies, 2008) and dynamic computerized displays (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008; Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005; Most, Simons, Scholl, & Chabris, 2000; Most et al., 2001; Simons & Jensen, 2009) as well as ''real-world" videos (Neisser, 1979; Simons & Chabris, 1999) . Spatial factors can influence whether observers notice an unexpected stimulus; rates of IB increase (i.e., noticing decreases) with distance from the focus of attention (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2000; Newby & Rock, 1998) . However, IB can occur when the unexpected stimulus appears directly in the observer's zone of attention (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2000) , so spatial attention alone is insufficient to explain IB. Other factors that can influence IB rates include the observer's attentional set (Most et al., 2001 (Most et al., , 2005 White & Aimola Davies, 2008) , the perceptual load or difficulty of the primary task (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Simons & Jensen, 2009; White & Aimola Davies, 2008) , and the presence of distractors (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008) .
Traditionally many IB studies required participants to fixate on a specific point in order to control for eye movements and visual input (e.g., Mack & Rock, 1998) . In most of these experiments the unexpected object appeared at or moved past fixation, demonstrating that IB can occur for objects that appear foveally (Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2000 Most et al., , 2001 Most et al., , 2005 . Even if observers cannot consciously report the unexpected stimulus, the fact that it appeared at fixation indicates that some level of visual processing must have occurred. However, the perceptual fate of undetected stimuli in an IB situation remains unknown. In many cases the unexpected stimulus is highly salient and would be expected to explicitly capture attention, such as a red cross in an otherwise monochromatic display (Most et al., 2001) . It is possible that observers process some elements of the unexpected stimulus and consequently reject it as irrelevant. Evidence suggests unexpected stimuli undergo processing to the level of semantic content; observers are more likely to detect emotionally salient stimuli such as happy faces or their own name (Mack & Rock, 1998) , or stimuli that belong to the same semantic category as relevant attended items (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007 , 2009 Koivisto et al., 2004) . In the case of personal names, small changes in lettering (i.e., Susan/Sosan) significantly decrease the chance of detection (Mack & Rock, 1998) . Other evidence indicates that the perceptual grouping required for the Ponzo and Müller-Lyer illusions can occur under conditions of inattention (Moore & Egeth, 1997) . Such results suggest that a sophisticated level of processing occurs for unattended stimuli, yet the details fail to be transmitted to consciousness. Similarly, undetected words can prime subsequent responses in word-stem 0042-6989/$ -see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2010.02.024 completion tasks (Mack & Rock, 1998) although using forcedchoice paradigms as a measure of implicit processing provides mixed results. In some studies participants correctly identify unexpected stimuli at or below chance level (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Mack, Tang, Tuma, Kahn, & Rock, 1992; Rock, Linnett, Grant, & Mack, 1992) , whereas in other studies they perform significantly above chance (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008; Mack & Rock, 1998) .
Overall this evidence suggests that although IB paradigms measure explicit attentional capture (Simons, 2000) , undetected stimuli in an IB situation may capture attention implicitly. This raises the question of why some unexpected stimuli do not reach awareness. Conscious identification of a stimulus requires attentional orienting and selective attention, which can occur by either covertly or overtly bringing a stimulus into the zone of attention. Using covert attention we can be aware of a stimulus without looking directly at it, or we can simultaneously employ overt and covert attention to examine two stimuli concurrently (see Most et al. (2005) and Posner (1980) , for extensive discussions). Covert attention does not involve an explicit eye movement towards the stimulus, so attentional orienting is not necessarily dependent on eye movements. By contrast, eye movements depend on both covert and overt attentional allocation. Covert orienting of attention occurs approximately 100 ms before we move our eyes (Posner & Petersen, 1990 ) and covertly shifting attention increases responsiveness to stimuli appearing in that location (Posner, 1980) . Overt attention may facilitate processing of a target by increasing acuity (Posner & Petersen, 1990) , but if high acuity is not necessary for target identification then covert attention is sufficient and foveating a stimulus may not yield any benefits (Posner, 1980) . Most et al. (2005) reformulated Neisser's perceptual cycle framework to accommodate these processes in an IB context. The framework involves a cognitive network of iterative feedback loops, which are initially instigated by bottom-up stimulus features that attract automatic orienting. Feedback loops assess the relevance of the stimulus with respect to the observer's attentional set, which in turn produce covert and/or overt attentional shifts that ultimately give rise to conscious awareness (Most et al., 2005) . This model of IB is embryonic, but not dissimilar to models for other attentional phenomena suggesting similar iterative feedback loops based on a mental template, such as the recent ''boost and bounce" theory for attentional blink (Olivers & Meeter, 2008) .
An unexpected stimulus is most at the mercy of an orienting mechanism. Because it is unexpected, strategic attentional shifts cannot be executed until it has been detected through the bottom-up processing of some salient featural quality. One potential method to explore this issue is to examine the eye movements generated by a participant. It is reasonably well established that attentional capture influences saccades towards a target (see Liversedge and Findlay (2000) and Rayner (2009) , for reviews). Anomalous stimuli in a natural visual scene can speed up the execution and processing of a saccade (Becker, Pashler, & Lubin, 2007; Rayner, Castelhano, & Yang, 2009 ), a peripheral cue can elicit attention during fixation resulting in enhanced discrimination at the cue location (Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, & Irwin, 1998) , and a remote distractor can result in an unattended saccade towards the distractor (Walker, Deubel, Schneider, & Findlay, 1997) . These results suggest the visual qualities of an unusual or unexpected object can be processed by a covert attentional mechanism, which provides input to initiate an eye movement and subsequent overt attentional processing. Therefore patterns of eye movements in IB could reveal whether an unexpected stimulus captures attention overtly and the extent to which it is processed. Of course, monitoring eye movements as an index of early attentional coding still does not obviate the possibility that covert attentional mechanisms are in play; an unexpected stimulus could be processed covertly and rejected as irrelevant based on some visual aspect, without initiating an eye movement. However, given that shifts of covert attention are required for shifts of overt attention (Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986) , if participants do saccade to the unexpected stimulus without consciously perceiving it, this suggests that covert and overt attentional capture occurred and that preconscious processing led to the stimulus being suppressed. Conversely if no saccadic movement is made towards the unexpected stimulus, then either the stimulus was rejected by covert attentional processes, or it did not capture attention. The latter seems unlikely given the findings that unexpected stimuli are processed semantically even when participants cannot report noticing them (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007 , 2009 Koivisto et al., 2004; Mack & Rock, 1998) .
Despite the potential implications of this, very few studies have examined the role of eye movements in IB. In a static experiment by Koivisto et al. (2004) rates of IB did not vary depending on patterns of eye movements; nearly one third of participants who were allowed to move their eyes looked directly at the unexpected stimulus, but most still did not report consciously perceiving it (Koivisto et al., 2004) . Similar patterns of eye movements were observed during noncritical trials, however, suggesting that the unexpected stimulus did not capture observers' eyes or preconscious attention but rather that participants had a tendency to move their eyes back to the fixation point, which was where the unexpected item appeared. There are nevertheless two intriguing findings in Koivisto et al.'s (2004) study: that eye movements do not differ between noticers and nonnoticers and that participants can directly fixate an object without noticing it. Comparable results have been found using dynamic stimuli. Memmert (2006) recorded children's eye movements while they viewed Simons and Chabris' (1999) ''gorilla" video and found no differences in fixation locations when comparing noticers and nonnoticers of the gorilla. Typically, all children fixated on the gorilla for up to one second (Memmert, 2006) , supporting Koivisto et al.'s (2004) result that it is possible to fixate on an unexpected stimulus without consciously noticing it. However, Memmert's (2006) findings have limited generalizability because children were used as participants. Young children are less susceptible to IB than older children or adults, which may be related to insufficient engagement in the primary task (Neisser, 1979) , and there is evidence that ability to control overt attention and eye movements develops and changes subtly over time (Kramer, Gonzalez de Sather, & Cassavaugh, 2005) . Further, in the task used observers must count passes that occur around the centre of the screen so, rather than attending to the gorilla, participants may have been fixating centrally in order to easily monitor the passes in that region. Finally, the video does not allow any control or comparison to determine the extent to which the presence of the unexpected stimulus influenced eye movements. For these reasons, in order to properly understand the role that eye movements play in sustained inattentional blindness, it is necessary to use dynamic stimuli that allow greater control of the display and to test this stimuli in an adult population.
The current study used a computerized sustained IB paradigm, which was established by Most et al. (2000 Most et al. ( , 2001 Most et al. ( , 2005 and adapted by other researchers (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008; Simons & Jensen, 2009 ). The paradigm consists of two subsets of shapes that differ on some dimension, usually color and/ or shape, which move at varied speeds and occasionally ''bounce" off the edges of the display. Participants are instructed to track one shape subset, for example by counting how many times the shapes bounce during each trial. On critical inattention trials an unexpected stimulus appears, usually traveling horizontally across the display and exiting before the end of the trial (but see Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008) . By systematically manipulating characteristics of the unexpected stimuli, Most et al. (2005) used the sustained IB paradigm to demonstrate that attentional set can determine whether an observer will notice unexpected objects. If the situation requires an observer to have a specific attentional set (e.g., attend squares, ignore circles), they will consciously notice an unexpected item that fits their attentional set (i.e., another square) but not one that falls outside it, even if the item is featurally distinct (i.e., a uniquely colored circle). Attentional set appears extremely powerful in terms of determining what will explicitly capture awareness, with research findings indicating that observers can adopt attentional sets for expected luminance (Most et al., 2001 (Most et al., , 2005 and shape of stimuli as well as more complex features such as racial identity of faces (Most et al., 2005) . Additionally, static IB experiments have demonstrated the existence of attentional sets for the expected number (White & Aimola Davies, 2008) and semantic category of stimuli (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2007 , 2009 Koivisto et al., 2004) . Bottomup salience remains influential, however; when both unattended and attended subsets of shapes have the same color (e.g., black circles and squares), an unexpected item of distinctive color and shape will be more likely to capture attention than an object that has distinct shape alone (i.e., white triangle vs. black triangle).
We sought to expand on current findings from the sustained IB literature by adapting this computerized dynamic paradigm for use in conjunction with an eyetracker. Through a series of experiments we investigated the role of eye movements in sustained IB by comparing results for participants who noticed the unexpected stimulus to those who did not notice it (or were not presented with it).
Experiment 1A
Most sustained IB research using computerized stimuli has required participants to fixate their eyes on a specific point (e.g., Most et al., 2000 Most et al., , 2001 Most et al., , 2005 . Some studies allowed participants to freely move their eyes and results indicate this may subtly alter the nature of inattentional blindness. Using a no-fixation design, Bressan and Pizzighello (2008) demonstrated that attentional resources were drawn away from the primary task only for nonnoticers who failed to report the unexpected stimulus. When they introduced a fixation point, accuracy on the primary task did not differ between noticers or nonnoticers of the unexpected stimulus (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008) . However, they did not measure eye movements to determine whether the decrease in primary task accuracy resulted from nonnoticers looking toward the unexpected stimulus and away from the bouncing objects, which would support their claim that the ''unseen" unexpected stimulus recruited attentional resources. In Experiment 1A we manipulated whether participants were required to fixate or allowed to move their eyes, with eye movements recorded to ensure participants followed instructions. Half the participants were required to fixate and half were allowed to move their eyes freely. Further, we investigated the role that eye movements play in sustained IB by examining whether eye movements differ between noticers and nonnoticers. Traditionally IB experiments contain only one critical trial (Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2008; Most et al., 2000 Most et al., , 2001 Most et al., , 2005 on the assumption that the critical trial may implicitly alert the participant to the unexpected stimulus even if they failed to notice it, removing the element of nonexpectation. More recently it has been demonstrated that two critical trials can be included if different stimuli are used as the unexpected stimulus each time and if the participant is not questioned about the unexpected items until after the second critical trial (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008) . We used an IB task with two critical trials to enable more opportunities for comparison between noticers and nonnoticers.
Method

Participants
Eighty undergraduates participated voluntarily, either for a class activity or course credit. Eight participants were excluded due to: realizing the experimental topic (3); extensive previous knowledge of IB (1); failure to follow instructions (1); failure to report the unexpected stimulus under full attention (1); experimenter error (1); and poor vision (1). The remaining 72 participants (71% female; M age = 21.4 years, SD = 4.6) were evenly distributed across two experimental conditions. All participants provided informed consent and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, as measured by accuracy on a Snellen chart.
Apparatus and stimuli
Eye movements were monitored using a Cambridge Research Systems Video Eyetracker Toolbox system incorporating a headrest and fixed 50 Hz camera with a resolution of 0.1°and accuracy of 0.5-0.25°. Visual stimuli were presented on computer using a 21" CRT monitor with a refresh rate of 85 Hz and screen resolution of 1024 Â 768 pixels. Stimuli were programmed using Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.). The stimulus display area consisted of a grey background (luminance 57 cd/m The experiment consisted of six 15 s trials, presented in the same order for each participant. Control trials (trials 1, 2 and 4) contained only the black and white letter shapes. Critical trials (trials 3 and 5) and the full attention trial (trial 6) also contained an extra item, the unexpected stimulus (US; see Fig. 1 ). The US was dark grey (24 cd/m 2 ; Weber contrast À0.58; size 1.6°Â 1.6°) in color and was either a symbol or letter shape: '+' in trial 3; 'X' in trial 5; and 'H' in trial 6. The US entered from the right display edge and traveled horizontally along the midline, exiting to the left. The US appeared after 5 s and exited at 10 s.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a dark room, with their head stabilized by the eyetracker chinrest at a viewing distance of 75 cm. Prior to beginning the experimental trials, the eyetracker was calibrated to each individual participant's gaze. All participants were informed that the experiment was assessing their object-tracking ability. In the eyes-fixating condition participants were instructed to fixate on the central fixation point. In the eyes-moving condition, participants were instructed to move their eyes as much as necessary in order to accurately track the objects.
After each trial, participants were asked to report the number of times the white letters bounced. Participants were not questioned about the US until after the second critical trial. US noticers were asked to describe its shape, color, speed and movement, and indicate during which trials it had appeared. They were then shown a forced-choice sheet containing eight shapes and asked to identify which shapes they had seen during the experiment. The shapes (A, E, F, H, X, Y, =, and +) were chosen for their featural similarity to the US shapes. Nonnoticers were informed that some trials contained extra items and asked to choose which shapes might have appeared using the same forced-choice sheet shown to noticers. No limit was placed on the number of choices a participant could make. The full attention trial took place after participants had been questioned about the unexpected stimuli. Participants were instructed not to count the bounces and to simply watch the display; eyes-fixating participants were reminded to maintain fixation. Participants who could not correctly report the color, shape and motion of the unexpected stimulus under conditions of full attention were excluded from subsequent analyses. Finally, during debriefing participants were questioned to determine whether they had any prior knowledge of IB research paradigms and participants with excessive IB knowledge were excluded.
Results and discussion
Behavioral data
Nearly 20% of participants reported noticing the US on one or both of the critical trials. Rates of noticing did not differ significantly between the eyes-fixating (25%) and eyes-moving condi-
(1, N = 72) = 1.42, p = .372, 2-sided, suggesting that IB does not differ whether observers are fixating or moving their eyes, contrary to the results of Bressan and Pizzighello (2008) . Among noticers, most participants noticed the US either on the second critical trial or both critical trials, with only 4% noticing on the first but not the second critical trial (see Table 1 ). Anecdotally, those who reported noticing the US once typically insisted that it only appeared once.
The primary bounce-counting task proved highly demanding and most participants underreported the number of bounces by at least 10%, with the average error rate across all trials around 21%. Eyes-fixating participants reported consistently lower bounce-counts compared to eyes-moving participants on all trials except the first, suggesting that nonfixating participants were able to adopt more effective tracking strategies after the first trial. For this reason, trial 1 was considered a practice trial and data from this trial were not further analyzed. Accuracy scores for all other trials were compared using 2 (condition: eyes-moving vs. eyes-fixating) Â 2 (IB: nonnoticers vs. noticers) between-subjects ANOVA. As shown in Table 2 , there was a main effect of condition for all trials except the fourth, which had the highest number of bounces and the highest error scores. There were no main effects for IB and no significant interactions, indicating that bounce-counting scores do not systematically differ between noticers and nonnoticers.
All noticers and 69% of nonnoticers correctly identified at least one US shape (+ and/or X) using the forced-choice sheet, which could tentatively be interpreted as indicative of implicit processing or priming. However, nearly three-quarters of nonnoticers also chose at least one incorrect shape. Most nonnoticers (55%) chose two shapes on the forced-choice sheet (M = 1.7, SD = 0.6). The most common choice was +, identified by 57% of nonnoticers. Other popular choices were F (29%), H (28%) and X (21%). The least-chosen shapes were A (2%), = (10%), E (12%) and Y (12%). Almost all noticers chose correct shapes exclusively; the only incorrect shape chosen by noticers was Y (14%).
Eye movements
Data from the eyes-fixating condition were checked to ensure that participants maintained fixation, but only the eyes-moving condition was fully analyzed. Data were screened and assessed for quality and continuity of recording. Most trials contained some missing data, typically due to blinks (which were allowed) or rapid eye movements across a large area (which sometimes resulted in a brief loss of signal). Since the nature of the experiment meant trials could not be repeated or interrupted, eye movement data from eight participants were discarded from the eyes-moving condition due to poor recording (i.e., <80% tracked). Of the remaining 28 participants, 3 noticed the US on the first critical trial and 3 noticed Fig. 1 . Sequence of trials. The first two trials contained only expected objects. Trial 3 was the first critical trial, containing ' + ' in Experiment 1A and 'A' in Experiment 2. Trial 4 again contained no unexpected stimulus. Trial 5 was the second critical trial, containing 'X' in Experiment 1A and '=' in Experiment 2. After trial 5 participants were questioned to determine whether they had noticed the US on either critical trial. Trial 6 was the full attention trial, with participants instructed to simply watch the screen without performing the bounce-counting task. the US on the second critical trial. Gaze location was logged by the eyetracker at 20 ms intervals. Each participant's gaze location was compared to the US location for each recorded time point and a distance score (i.e., distance from fixation to US) was computed. Fig. 2 depicts example output showing the horizontal and vertical traces (deviation from fixation), comparing a noticer and a nonnoticer on a critical trial, as well as a full attention trial. The shaded regions indicate periods where the observer was looking within 2°of the US: in Fig. 2A the noticer tracked the US twice; in Fig. 2B the nonnoticer fixated within the trajectory of the US; and in Fig. 2C the observer tracked the stimulus intermittently throughout the full attention trial. In order to get a general measure of how far each participant's gaze was from the US, these scores were used to compute the average distance of between each participant's fixation location and the US for the 5 s period that the US was fully visible on screen. Within the eyes-moving condition, there were no significant differences in gaze distance from the US comparing noticers and nonnoticers for the first (nonnoticers: . For the full attention trial the average gaze distance from the US was 4.6°(SD = 1.9°), due to the tendency of participants to directly track the US for at least part of the final trial (see Fig. 2C ). Initially participants were classified as looking at the US if they fixated directly on the US location for at least 80 ms. However, the data revealed that very few participants (614% on either trial) looked directly at the US so a further set of measures were calculated for gaze duration near the US. Participants were considered to have looked near the US if they fixated within 1°, 2°, 3°or 4°vi-sual angle of the US for at least 80 ms. The maximum value of 4°w as chosen because it places the US within one saccade of fixation, based on an average saccade size of 4-5°for scene perception and search tasks (Rayner, 2009) . As shown in Table 3 , noticers were no more likely than nonnoticers to look near the US on either the first or the second critical trial. In addition, on both trials nonnoticers looked directly at the location of the US. Fig. 3 presents the average time spent looking either directly at (i.e., 0°from the US) or near (i.e., 1-4°from the US) the US for noticers compared to nonnoticers. The values for noticers should be interpreted cautiously, however, given the small number of participants represented (n 6 3), especially for the second critical trial where there is great variability.
In addition to this, we examined the time at which observers first looked at near the US. During the first critical trial, for both nonnoticers and noticers this was typically 1450-1600 ms after its entrance, between two white letter bounces on diagonally opposite sides of the display when observers would have been shifting their overt attention to detect the location of the next bounce. During the second critical trial, it was approximately 1650 ms after its entrance for noticers and around 2150-2300 ms after its entrance for nonnoticers. In both cases, this was between two white bounces that occurred vertically opposite each other, so observers would have been in the process of shifting their attention from the bottom of the screen to the top and necessarily would have intersected the midline where the US appeared.
Eye movements were also not related to shape choices. Participants who chose the correct US shape were no more likely to look at or near the US during the critical trials. On the first critical trial, 46% of those who looked directly at the US chose the correct shape (+) from the forced-choice sheet, compared to 62% of those who did not look at the US, v
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(1, N = 64) = 1.75, p = .212, 2-sided. The US shape for the second critical trial (X) was chosen by 40% of those who looked directly at the US and 25% of those who did not,
(1, N = 64) = 1.50, p = .282, 2-sided. This finding, that several participants looked directly at the US without consciously reporting it or even guessing the correct shape, contradicts the suggestion that correct shape choices indicate implicit processing.
Overall our data from Experiment 1A suggests that eye movements do not necessarily differ between noticers and nonnoticers, supporting previous IB research using different experimental paradigms (Koivisto et al., 2004; Memmert, 2006) . In particular, our data indicate that noticers and nonnoticers are equally likely to make saccades close to unexpected items, suggesting that the US may implicitly capture observers' attention irrespective of whether they consciously notice it. However, the small number of noticers in Experiment 1A and the large variability demand further evidence to fully support this suggestion.
Experiment 1B
One possible explanation for the results of Experiment 1A is that neither noticers nor nonnoticers were specifically making a saccade to the unexpected stimulus, but rather they were looking at or near its location because they were tracking items that bounced nearby. As such, the similarity in eye movements between noticers and nonnoticers could be epiphenomenal. To investigate this possibility we conducted a follow-up, Experiment 1B, in which participants were not presented with an unexpected stimulus. The primary task was identical to Experiment 1A in terms of stimuli and movements (i.e., number and pattern of bounces) except that no unexpected stimulus appeared. The major reason for this was to determine whether primary task accuracy and patterns of eye movements were affected by the presence of the unexpected stimulus. If the similarity of eye movements between noticers and nonnoticers was indeed an epiphenomenon then we should find no difference in either eye movements or behavioral measures between participants in Experiments 1A and 1B.
3.1. Method 3.1.1. Participants
Ten postgraduate students (80% female; M age = 26.8 years, SD = 3.8) participated voluntarily and were offered AU$5 compensation. All participants provided informed consent and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure
The apparatus, procedure and stimuli were identical to the eyes-moving condition in Experiment 1A, with one exception: no unexpected stimuli appeared during the first five trials. Only the final full attention trial contained an unexpected object.
Results
Behavioral data
Rates of inattentional blindness are not applicable since there was no US to notice. All participants noticed the US on the final full attention trial. As with Experiment 1A, participants tended to underreport the number of bounces on all trials. Comparisons with the eyes-moving group from Experiment 1A indicated no differences in bounce-counting accuracy between groups (see Table 4 ). This suggests that in this experiment, at least, primary task accuracy was not affected by the mere presence of the US. The + was again the most popular choice for the US shape. There were no significant differences in the patterns of shape choices between Experiment 1B and the nonnoticers from Experiment 1A (see Table 5 ).
Eye movements
Participants from Experiment 1B (when no US appeared) were compared to eyes-moving participants from Experiment 1A (when the US did appear). Data from three participants was discarded due to poor recording. For the remaining seven participants, gaze location at each point in time on trials 3 and 5 (i.e., the critical trials) was compared to the location and time at which the US appeared during Experiment 1A. The average gaze distance from where the US would have appeared did not differ significantly from Experiment 1A on trial 5 (no US: M = 10.7°, SD = 1.9°; US present: M = 11.0°, SD = 1.6°; t(33) = 0.51, p = .615, CI 95 [À1.1, 1.8]). For trial 3 gaze distance was, paradoxically, actually slightly closer to the US trajectory for participants who did not have the US appear onscreen (no US: M = 10.4°, SD = 1.6°; US present: M = 11.7°, SD = 1.4°; t(33) = 2.08, p = .046, CI 95 [0.0, 2.5]). On the final full attention trial, when the US did appear, the average gaze distance from the US was 4.1°( SD = 1.2°), which again was not significantly different to the full attention trial in Experiment 1A, t(32) = 0.65, p = .520, CI 95 [À1.0, 2.0]. Similarly, there were no significant differences in the proportion of participants looking near the locations where the US would have appeared during the critical trials (see Table 6 ), or their gaze durations (see Fig. 4 ), when compared to Experiment 1A. There was a nonsignificant trend where participants in Experiment 1B spent slightly longer looking at or near the US location, even though it did not actually appear onscreen. Finally, the time at which observers first looked near the US location was comparable to both noticers and nonnoticers from Experiment 1A; around 1500-1700 ms for the first critical trial and 1900-2200 ms for the second critical trial. This strongly suggests that looking near or even at the US in Experiment 1A may have occurred as a consequence of tracking bouncing items, potentially for noticers as well as nonnoticers.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1B suggest that the presence of an unexpected stimulus does not necessarily alter either observers' Note: Fisher's Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons contained at least one cell with an expected value less than 5. a n = 25. b n = 3. Fig. 3 . Experiment 1A average duration looking at (i.e., 0°) or near (i.e., 1-4°) of the unexpected stimulus location on the first and second critical trials, comparing nonnoticers to noticers. eye movements or their overt behavior as measured by task performance. This suggests that the similarities between noticers' and nonnoticers' eye movements in Experiment 1A may have been due to participants tracking items other than the unexpected stimulus. In other words, although some participants made saccades towards the US, these were not unique or deliberate saccades. Although we demonstrated that noticers and nonnoticers were equally likely to make a saccade to the US, we also found that the two groups performed equally well on the primary bouncecounting task. It is possible that their vigilance tracking the bouncing objects led their gaze to spatially overlap the trajectory of the US across the screen. In this case, it may be that nonnoticers ''suppressed" the unexpected stimulus because it appeared near the attended items, but this explanation does not offer any insight into why some observers do notice the US under the same circumstances. Even more surprising is our finding that some noticers did not actually fixate directly on the US, which suggests that covert mechanisms play a key role in detection -and possibly rejection, in the case of nonnoticers -of unexpected objects in IB paradigms.
Another interesting outcome of Experiment 1B was that patterns of shape choices were identical regardless of whether an unexpected stimulus actually appeared, suggesting that correct shape choice in Experiment 1A was more likely to be the result of educated guessing rather than implicit processing.
Experiment 2
Although Experiment 1 provides some interesting insight into the role of eye movements in IB for dynamic stimuli, it is limited because so few participants looked directly at the US during critical trials. Therefore we have not properly tested our original hypothesis that IB can occur even when participants fixate directly on an unexpected stimulus. One issue in our first experiment was primary task demands: task performance was quite poor because the items bounced so frequently. Participants who performed the task diligently necessarily had to follow the same pattern of eye movements, with little opportunity for deviation away from the attended items. Further, the high perceptual load of the task yielded very high rates of IB and consequently comparisons between noticers and nonnoticers involved severely unequal groups with a very small number of noticers. It has been well established that easier tasks, which have lower perceptual load, yield significantly lower rates of IB (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Koivisto & Revonsuo, 2009; Neisser, 1979; Simons & Jensen, 2009; White & Aimola Davies, 2008) . The traditional explanation for such findings are that under high perceptual load there are fewer attentional resources available to be captured by an US, whereas in situations of lower perceptual load more attentional resources are free to deal with additional environmental stimuli. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we modified the experimental stimuli to make the bounce-counting task easier. This lower perceptual load was intended to decrease rates of IB, thereby producing approximately equal proportions of noticers and nonnoticers, as well as to allow for greater potential variation in eye movements, if indeed it was the case in Experiment 1 that participants simply did not have time to deviate their overt attention from the bouncing white letters.
Method
Participants
Fifty-five undergraduate students participated voluntarily for course credit. Five participants were excluded due to: realizing the experimental topic (2); participation in a previous experiment (1); failure to notice the US under full attention (1); and experimenter error (1). The remaining 50 participants (68% female; M age = 18.6 years, SD = 1.0) were evenly distributed across two experimental conditions. All participants provided informed consent and had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure
The apparatus was the same as in Experiments 1A and 1B. The trial structure and stimuli were highly similar to Experiment 1A, with three major changes. First, the speed of the attended and unattended objects was slowed so that each item bounced only 1-4 times per trial, with white items bouncing a total of 9-10 times per trial (M = 9.4, SD = 0.5). Secondly, the shapes of the unexpected objects were changed so that 'A' appeared on critical trial 1 and '=' appeared on critical trial 2. These shapes were included because they were the two least-frequently chosen shapes in Experiment 1A; therefore, if participants in the current experiment guessed them as the US shape it would provide stronger evidence that their choices were due to priming or implicit processing. A '+' appeared on the full attention trial. The third major change was the speed of the US, which was manipulated in two experimental conditions. In the fast-US condition the stimulus entered at 5 s and took approximately 5 s to cross the display, as in Experiment 1A, but was much faster than the other items on screen. In the slow-US condition the stimulus moved at a similar speed to other items in the display and took approximately 9 s to cross the display, entering at 5 s exiting prior to the final bounce. The manipulation was to determine whether there were pop-out effects for speed in the fast-US condition because pilot studies in our lab indicated that, in addition to the perceptual load of the bounce-counting task, speed of the US relative to other items on screen might be important. The experimental procedure was the same as the eyes-moving condition in Experiment 1A, except that nonnoticers were instructed to choose two shapes for the US from the forced- Note: Fisher's Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons had at least one cell with an expected count less than 5. Note: Fisher's Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons contained at least one cell with an expected value less than 5.
choice sheet and asked to explain the rationale for their particular choices.
Results and discussion
Behavioral data
Overall, nearly half the participants noticed the US at least once. Rates of noticing did not differ between the slow-US condition (44%) and the fast-US condition (48%), v 2 (1, N = 50) = 0.08, p = 1.000, 2-sided. This seems to suggest that relative speed of the US is unimportant. However, it is worth noting that the US was on screen for nearly twice as long in the slow-US condition compared to the fast-US condition, which allowed participants more opportunities for noticing, yet the two conditions yielded almost identical rates of IB overall. There was a trend for more participants in the fast-US condition to notice the US on both critical trials (see Table 7 ), but this was not significant using Fisher's Exact Test, p = .069, 2-sided. Anecdotally, most noticers in the fast-US condition perceived the US to be the same speed or even slower than the other items on screen, even though it was actually faster.
Accuracy on the bounce-counting task was extremely high, with all mean difference scores less than ±1. Thus, while our task was not effective at varying perceptual load between experimental conditions (i.e., slow-US vs. fast-US), we succeeded in our aim to decrease the perceptual load of the primary task, when compared to Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1A, accuracy scores were compared using a 2 (condition: slow-US vs. fast-US) Â 2 (IB: nonnoticers vs. noticers) between-subjects ANOVA. There were no main effects of condition or IB (see Table 8 ) but there was a significant interaction on the final critical trial only whereby noticers in the slow-US condition performed significantly worse at bouncecounting.
Approximately 26% of nonnoticers correctly guessed one of the two US shapes (A and/or =), which is equivalent to chance (2:8). The most commonly chosen shape was + (52%), followed by F (30%), X (30%), E (26%), Y (22%) and H (15%). The two US shapes were actually the least popular choices (= 15%; A 11%). Nearly half the nonnoticers (48%) reported that their shape choices were based on what they thought was most likely to appear, typically because the shapes were perceived as ''most similar" to the expected items. A further 15% guessed randomly and 15% based their decision on ''gut feelings" and what ''seemed familiar". This confirms the possibility raised by our Experiment 1B results, namely that responses provided in a forced-choice situation are susceptible to educated guesses and therefore do not reveal implicit processing or priming effects.
Eye movements
Data were screened and analyzed using the same procedures as Experiments 1A and 1B; 19 participants were discarded due to poor recording.
1 Of the remaining 31 participants, 7 noticed the US on the first critical trial and 9 noticed on the second critical trial. Average gaze distance was compared using a 2 (condition: slow-US vs. fast-US) Â 2 (IB: nonnoticers vs. noticers) between-subjects ANO-VA. Consistent with Experiment 1A, there were no significant differences in average gaze distance on either the first critical trial, Using the criteria established in Experiment 1A, nearly all participants looked near the US on both critical trials and several participants looked directly at the US (see Table 9 ). Noticers were slightly more likely to look at or near the US location, however the only significant difference in rates of looking was on the first critical trial, when fast-US noticers were more likely to look directly at the US than nonnoticers in the same condition. Similarly, there was a general trend for noticers to spend slightly longer looking near the US on both the first critical trial (see Fig. 5 ) and the second critical trial (see Fig. 6 ). Although the US appeared for nearly twice as long in the slow-US condition, participants did not spend any longer looking at it, as shown in Figs. 5 and 6. Average duration spent looking at or near the US was analyzed for each distance using 2 (condition: slow-US vs. fast-US) Â 2 (IB: nonnoticers vs. noticers) between-subjects AN-OVA. These analyses revealed a statistically significant effect only for duration spent looking within 1°of the US the second critical trial, not significant for the first critical trial, a similar pattern of results was observed for the fast-US condition (indicated on the right side of Fig. 5 ) but not the slow-US condition (see Fig. 5, left) .
There was no relationship between looking at the US and correctly identifying its shape. On both critical trials, none of the nonnoticers who looked directly at the US correctly identified the shape using the forced-choice sheet. Further, on the first critical trial 29% of noticers incorrectly identified the US shape despite having fixated on it during the trial. (These participants were nevertheless classed as noticers because they could correctly describe other attributes of the stimulus, including color and motion trajectory.) On the second critical trial all noticers correctly identified the US shape, even though only 50% (combining both experimental conditions) directly fixated on it.
General discussion
The present study was one of the first to employ an eyetracker to record eye movements during a dynamic inattentional blindness paradigm. The results confirm and expand on the finding from previous experiments that inattentional blindness can occur even when observers move their eyes to directly fixate on an object (Koivisto et al., 2004; Memmert, 2006) . Participants in the current experiment were free to move their eyes across the whole display, and thus free to make a saccade to the unexpected object to bring it within the focus of attention. Compared to noticers, observers who failed to notice the unexpected object were for the most part equally likely to make an eye movement towards the object. We found a strong tendency for noticers to spend longer than nonnoticers looking directly at or within 2°of the unexpected stimulus in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 1A. It is not clear whether a longer gaze duration is the cause or effect of noticing: noticers may have been able to report the stimulus because they spent longer looking at it, or they may have looked for longer because they consciously noticed it. The latter explanation seems more plausible given the results of Experiment 1A, however one limitation in interpreting our results from Experiment 1A is that the numbers of noticers and nonnoticers were unequal, which prohibited reliable comparisons. Nevertheless, it is clear that in Experiment 2 the primary task was relatively easy for most participants, which may have allowed noticers to simultaneously attend to both the bounce-counting task and the unexpected stimulus, whereas more demanding tasks do not afford the same opportunity. Overall, however, it appears that eye movements do not predict the incidence of IB, since in both Experiments 1A and 2 there were participants who detected the US without looking directly at it, as well as participants who looked directly at the US but could not consciously report it. Lavie (1995) proposed the perceptual load model of attention, arguing that the degree to which irrelevant distractors or unexpected items capture attention varies depending on the perceptual load requirements of the primary task. Tasks involving high per- Note: Fisher's Exact Tests (2-sided) were calculated in SPSS because all comparisons contained at least one cell with an expected value less than 5. a n = 18. b n = 13. * p < .05.
ceptual load leave fewer remaining attentional resources that can detect and process distractors. Conversely, low perceptual load tasks have greater attentional resources remaining for processing other stimuli, such as distractors, and in these cases irrelevant or unexpected items will be processed automatically. The perceptual load model was demonstrated to predict occurrence of IB in a static paradigm (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007) . Consistent with the results of Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2007), we found that rates of IB dropped with perceptual load of the primary task, from 81% in Experiment 1A to 54% in Experiment 2. However, in the current experiments our index of attentional capture was whether observers made a saccade towards the US. Consequently, it could be the case that in Experiment 1 unique eye movements were not made to the US because primary task demands on overt attention were too high; eye movements that were spatially coexistent with the US were likely to coincide with participants moving their eyes to track primary task items. The fact that several participants consciously noticed the US and could fully identify it without making a unique saccade to it indicates that US identification must be able to occur covertly, especially in cases where task demands prohibit observers from moving their eyes to the US. Eye movements may be prohibited either because participants are required to maintain fixation, or because they are tracking other items, as demonstrated in Experiment 2 when lower attentional demands of the primary task allowed participants to direct overt attention and make unique saccades to the US. The crucial finding of interest, however, is that overt attention is clearly neither necessary nor sufficient for detecting an unexpected stimulus in an inattentional blindness paradigm. The bulk of evidence investigating covert visual attention has looked at effects of cuing and attentional orienting (e.g., Posner, 1980) . Research using cuing paradigms has suggested that attention can be drawn covertly to a peripheral cue or target when it possesses salient or unique properties (e.g., Carrasco & McElree, 2001; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Franconeri, Hollingworth, & Simons, 2005; Jonides, 1981; Kim & Cave, 1999; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) . The current study adds to knowledge in this area by demonstrating that in an IB paradigm, unexpected stimuli can be identified covertly with no resultant drop in primary task performance.
If we accept that noticers can process the US covertly, which is consistent with previous research that prohibited participants from making eye movements (e.g., Most et al., 2000 Most et al., , 2001 Most et al., , 2005 , this raises questions about precisely what differentiates noticers from nonnoticers. It is possible that nonnoticers do not perceive unexpected stimuli because they do not direct their attention, covert or overt, to it -they do not see it because they do not look at it. This seems unsupportable, though, given that some noticers fail to ''look" at objects that they can nevertheless report ''seeing" and also that some nonnoticers do in fact look directly at the unexpected object. Based on this we must at least consider the possibil- ity that nonnoticers may process the stimuli to a similar extent to noticers, although it fails to reach conscious awareness. Rather than IB being a state of ''failing to see" an unexpected stimulus, we propose that nonnoticers may in fact simply be more efficient at rejecting stimuli that are deemed unimportant to the primary task. There is potential to resolve this question with recourse to implicit processing measures, however to date attempts to do so have produced conflicting results. Mack and Rock (1998) demonstrated that participants who failed to notice an unexpected word stimulus still showed evidence of priming in a subsequent wordstem completion task. This suggests that some degree of attentional coding may occur for nonnoticers, which may in turn allow them to reject the US as irrelevant.
A key issue here is the methods used to assess potential implicit processing. While some previous research suggested that nonnoticers could indirectly identify the unexpected stimulus using a forced-choice array of possibilities (Bressan & Pizzighello, 2008; Mack & Rock, 1998) , this was not supported by our current results or other previous research (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Mack et al., 1992; Rock et al., 1992) . However our results from Experiment 1B and Experiment 2 suggest that participants use logic and deduction in order to choose which shape they consider would be most likely to appear. This means they are more likely to guess correctly when the unexpected stimulus is the option perceived as most similar to the other items on screen (i.e., + in a field of Ls and Ts). This could explain the seemingly conflicting results from forced-choice tasks in past IB experiments. More sensitive priming measures are required in experiments that use dynamic stimuli, rather than forced-choice paradigms, in order to determine whether implicit processing occurs for unnoticed stimuli. If under high perceptual load, nonnoticers failed to make unique saccades towards the US (as in Experiment 1 here) but showed evidence of priming, this would support the notion that nonnoticers are covertly processing unexpected stimuli before rejecting or suppressing them. This also raises the possibility that nonnoticers are actually employing more efficient attentional processes, by rapidly rejecting or screening out irrelevant items. Little research has been done on individual differences in IB, since most studies have employed only one critical trial per participant (see Mack and Rock (1998) , for a discussion). However, it appears that aptitude in the primary task does not influence likelihood of experiencing IB (Simons & Jensen, 2009 ). Therefore other cognitive factors relating to attention, which have not been explored in the IB research to date, are likely to determine what people ''see" regardless of where they are looking.
